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ALICE IN WONDERLAND MEETS THE U.S. PATENT 
SYSTEM 
Jay Dratler, Jr.∗ 
Among the joys of being a professor, as distinguished from 
practicing law, are the leisure and incentive to think and write about the 
big picture.  Another joy is being able to say what you really think.  We 
professors don’t have to focus on attracting clients or maintaining an 
impression of studied understatement and moderation for judges and 
juries. 
In this talk, I’m going to exercise both of these prerogatives.  I’ve 
been thinking about the big picture in patents for over a quarter century, 
and I’m more worried than I’ve ever been. 
Let me begin by making my usual (and truthful) disclaimer.  I’m 
not one of those academics who delights in being a gadfly and finding 
cause for alarm in every new law and every twist and turn of legal 
history.  I’m the author of three treatises—on intellectual property 
generally,1 licensing,2 and cyberlaw.3  I’ve spent much of the last 
thirteen years of my life writing and revising them.  Like treatises 
generally, each largely describes and explains our current intellectual 
property system, and each finds much to like in what both recent and 
earlier history have wrought.  More fundamentally, I strongly subscribe 
to the view that the robust intellectual property system of Anglo-
American society is in part responsible for our society’s extraordinary 
 
∗ Jay Dratler, Jr., Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of Law 
for presentation at The Sixth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law 
and Policy at Akron, Ohio, March 15, 2004.  Copyright 2004  to Jay Dratler, Jr.  Permission granted 
to copy for personal use by individuals (not groups) for any nonprofit purpose, and for any nonprofit 
use confined to the University of Akron.  All other rights reserved. 
 1. JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Law Journal Press 1991) (two volumes, updated semiannually) [hereinafter 
1 DRATLER]. 
 2. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Law Journal Press 1994) 
(two volumes, updated semiannually). 
 3. JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM  
(Law Journal Press 2000) (one volume, updated semiannually). 
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economic success over the last four centuries. 
But the warning signs of excess are everywhere.  One need look no 
farther than the Federal Trade Commission’s White Paper that is the 
subject of today’s discussion.4 Think about it.  Congress has clipped the 
FTC’s policy wings so often that it’s a wonder the agency can fly at all.  
Moreover, for the first time in decades, the executive and legislative 
branches of our government are controlled by Republicans, who have 
not generally been zealous advocates for aggressive antitrust 
enforcement and “pruning” the IP laws.  Yet even in this very 
conservative political environment, the FTC—a much-chastened 
agency—has proposed ten recommendations (fourteen, if you count the 
subheads) for reining in the patent system.5  If that isn’t a clear sign that 
something desperately needs attention, I don’t know what is. 
Therefore I’m going to take the premise of my talk—that something 
is wrong—for granted.  In the short time that I have, I’d like to explore 
three further questions.  First, what is wrong?  Second, how can we fix 
it?  And third, how important is it that we do so? 
I.  WHY THESE ISSUES MATTER 
Let me take the third question first.  How important are these 
issues, anyway?  Does it really matter if too many patents issue and that 
their claims are too broad?  For two reasons, I think it matters a lot. 
The attached article6 outlines in some detail why I think it matters 
in two particular fields—software and business methods—in which the 
PTO has issued, and the Federal Circuit has upheld, what I think are too 
many patents on non-inventions.  The following remarks take a broader 
and longer-range view of patents generally. 
The first reason why having a properly balanced patent system 
matters relates to the historical period in which we find ourselves.  The 
world is now in the process of transferring the self-evident benefits of 
robust innovation, free markets, and free trade from Anglo-American 
and other advanced societies to the rest of the planet.  This transfer, 
often pejoratively termed “globalization” by “multinational 
corporations,” involves far more than mere globalized marketing of 
 
 4. To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, 
A Report by the Federal Trade Commission (October 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
reports/index.htm (containing an index to the document in Acrobat format) (last visited February 23, 
2004) [hereinafter FTC WHITE PAPER]. 
 5. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 7-18 (executive summary of recommendations). 
 6. Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live?  The Case against Software and Business-
Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003) [hereinafter DARCY ARTICLE]. 
DRATLER1.DOC 3/11/2005  11:25 AM 
2005] ALICE IN WONDERLAND 301 
American products and far more than just the largest industrial 
combines.  It is an extremely complex, far-reaching process. In the long 
run, it is likely not only to improve the standard of living in, but also to 
democratize, much of the planet.  When the history of this period has 
been written, this transition may be as important as—or even more 
important than—the Industrial Revolution.  Innovation and the patent 
laws that encourage it are, of course, a vital part of this process. 
The internationalizing trend is probably irreversible, although 
retrenchment and backsliding no doubt will occur.  In the short term, the 
transfer of wealth and jobs from advanced to poorer societies that 
attends it will cause considerable pain on the part of workers in the 
developed world.  As many have noted, innovation and the laws that 
protect it are among the few bright spots for developed nations in the 
short term.  Therefore, innovation and the laws governing it are 
exceedingly important, both for insuring the well-being of workers in the 
United States and other developed countries and thereby insuring that 
this inevitable long-term change proceeds with as little short-term pain 
as possible.  If United States patent law provides the wrong balance and 
impairs innovation instead of fostering it, it will make the short-term 
pain in our country more acute, and perhaps longer, than it need be. 
The second reason why patents and laws governing innovation are 
so important is seldom stated but perhaps most fundamental.  The patent 
system and those laws affect a value we Americans perhaps hold most 
dear: liberty.  Liberty is not only a matter of human rights or freedom 
from tyranny.  There is such a thing as economic liberty.  Indeed, as raw 
tyranny of the type exemplified by Saddam Hussein recedes from the 
world stage, economic liberty no doubt will become more and more 
important. 
By virtue of his race, Justice Thurgood Marshall was no stranger to 
the blessings of liberty and the pain of its denial.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that he penned one of the most important and moving paeans 
to economic liberty ever written in a judicial opinion.  When I used to 
teach antitrust law, I read his words aloud at some point in every class, 
and I’d like to read them now: 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise.  They are as important to the 
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as 
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms.  And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no 
matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, 
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can 
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muster.7 
Of course this passage addresses the antitrust laws, not patent law.  
But it is well understood that antitrust law and patent law are just two 
sides of the same coin—the coin of economic law.  The English 
recognized this point nearly four centuries ago, when the Parliament 
adopted the Statute of Monopolies.8  That statute imposed a general 
prohibition on monopoly,9 much like our Sherman Act,10 but it allowed 
patents as an exception to the general rule.11  In the attached article,12 I 
argue, inter alia, that American law should be similarly interpreted, as 
rule and exception, despite the fact that our Sherman Act was not 
adopted for nearly a century after our Constitution was ratified.13 
How does economic law, including patents, affect economic 
liberty?  To answer that question, we need only look at the industry—
software—in which our runaway patent system has most nearly run off 
the tracks.  The notorious case of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc.14 exemplifies the problem.  The alleged 
“inventor” there had written a pedestrian computer program to manage a 
certain type of investment vehicle, a “hub and spoke” investment 
partnership.15  The program made pedestrian arithmetic calculations, 
mostly as required by rules of the SEC and other accounting and tax 
authorities.16  Nothing in the claims at issue addressed any particular 
 
 7. United States v. Topco Assoc.., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 8. “An Act concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with penall Lawes and the Forfeyture 
thereof,” 21 Jam., c.3 (1623), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1212 (1810) [hereinafter 
STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES].  For further discussion of this seminal source of all modern economic 
law, its close resemblance to the United States’ Sherman Act, and its relevance to modern patent 
law and policy, see DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 823-30. 
 9. See STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, § 1 (decreeing in part that “all monopolies 
and all commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and letter patent heretofore made or granted . . . of or 
for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything within this realm . . . , are and 
shall be utterly void. . . .”). 
 10. Among other things, the Statute of Monopolies relied on common law and, case-by-case 
application to avoid circumvention and provided for treble damages and costs to prevailing 
plaintiffs.  See id. § 2, § 4(1) - (2).  See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 825-26.  Cf. Sherman 
Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (prohibiting monopolization) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 
(2004)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38. Stat. 730 (1914) (providing for treble damages, costs, and 
attorneys’ fees for successful plaintiff) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2004)). 
 11. See STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, §§ 6, 10.  See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra 
note 6, at 826. 
 12. See generally DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6. 
 13. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 823-33. 
 14. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-77 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
 15. See id. at 1371-72.  See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 862-63, 871-74. 
 16. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1371-72. 
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algorithm, programming technique or method of programming.17  For all 
those claims revealed, the alleged “inventor” had done nothing more 
than write a pedestrian computer program for performing routine 
arithmetic calculations dictated by legal authority, using programming 
languages, techniques and computers invented—if at all—by someone 
else.18 
The claims, however, were not limited to any particular 
programming methods; they were broad enough to cover any computer 
program used in any manner to control that type of business.  The 
district court, recognizing this point, invalidated the patent as directed to 
unpatentable subject matter,19 but the Federal Circuit reversed.20  Since 
the type of business involved could hardly be run today without 
programmed digital computers, the result of this decision was to give the 
inventor of nothing a twenty-year monopoly on a type of investment 
vehicle: a business method.21 
How do decisions like this affect economic liberty?  Very 
negatively, I would say.  Think of yourself as a young stockbroker or 
investment banker creating new and imaginative investment vehicles, 
whether of the hub-and-spoke or of another variety.  If you consult with 
patent counsel, she will tell you that you have to get permission from 
this patentee to do so, perhaps paying a portion of your profits, and that, 
unless you buy a license, the patentee can stop your business on a whim.  
You ask her what programming method the patent covers, and she 
answers none: it covers any use of computers to run that type of business 
that you want to devise.  So what do you do?  Most likely, you forget 
about your new business ideas and go back to flogging stocks.  That 
certainly doesn’t sound like the free, entrepreneurial America that I was 
raised to revere. 
You might say that State Street was an aberration, and, indeed, in 
the long sweep of American patent law and policy, it probably was.  But 
lately the patent bar, the Federal Circuit, and the PTO seem to have been 
 
 17. See id. (reciting part of key patent claim). 
 18. I am hardly the only commentator to notice this anomaly.  See John R. Thomas, The 
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1156-57 (1999). 
 19. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 516 (D. 
Mass. 1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
 20. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1376-77 (quoting district court’s finding that valid patent 
would provide monopoly over hub-and-spoke investment partnership business, but finding it lawful 
patent monopoly). 
 21. See id. at 1375-76.  The Federal Circuit saw a line of cases prohibiting business-method 
monopolies as misguided or misinterpreted.  Id.  For criticism of its reasoning and conclusion, see 
DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 871-75. 
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swept up by a “land rush” mentality.  If intellectual property protection 
is good, they seem to say, more protection is necessarily better.  And so 
we have a seemingly endless procession of patents on such things as 
minor improvements of simple mechanical, electrical, and electronic 
devices, pedestrian computer programs that any college graduate in 
computer science could write, and business methods—seemingly the 
very subject of the English Parliament’s prohibition against monopoly 
nearly 400 years ago.22  The basic institutions of our patent system seem 
to have forgotten entirely the notion of balance that has made the Anglo-
American legal system so successful. 
Lest readers think I am alone in decrying the “land rush” mentality, 
I would like to quote a short passage from a colleague’s work.  Consider 
Professor Thomas’ lament: 
Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 1968 patent 
on a method of swallowing a pill.  Now we need scant imagination to 
envision patents on corporate ingestion of poison pills as well.  With 
business and medical techniques firmly under wing, and patents on 
sports methods and procedures of psychological analysis trickling out 
of the Patent Office, patents appropriating almost any sort of 
communicable practice seem easily attainable.  Claims to methods 
within the disciplines of sociology, political science, economics and 
the law appear to present only the nearest frontier for the regime of 
patents.  Under increasingly permissive Federal Circuit case law, 
techniques within such far-flung disciplines as language, the fine arts  
and theology also now appear to be within the realm of 
patentability.”23 
This “land rush” mentality is not just wrongheaded and grossly out 
of balance.  It has tangible economic costs.  Just as the “land rush” 
mentality in California’s Gold Rush days left less land for farming and 
settling, so the “land rush” mentality in patent law leaves little place for 
creative minds to go.  Everywhere they turn, someone stands with a 
piece of paper and a lawyer in a pin-striped suit saying, “Sorry, you 
can’t go here; this set of ideas is mine.”  The results of this “no room 
here” philosophy on creative minds, I believe, is only beginning to be 
felt in such places as Silicon Valley, Silicon Forest, and Route 128.  I 
think it will get much worse before it gets better. 
I first presented the subject matter of this article at the University of 
Akron’s Sixth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual 
 
 22. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 871-76, 891-92, for more on this point. 
 23. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1163-
1164 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
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Property Law and Policy under the written title “Our Runaway Patent 
System: Can we Stop it before it Derails our Economy?”  As I prepared 
to step up before an audience of 150-odd patent lawyers, it occurred to 
me that such a title would not particularly appeal to an audience of those 
who make a fine living from the “land rush.”  Therefore I proposed a 
change in title to the current one.  The idea behind the title was a simple 
one: using the metaphor of “Alice in Wonderland” to look at our patent 
system with fresh eyes.  In addition to “softening” what might appear to 
be the “radical” cast of this article, the new title captured perfectly its 
essence: a review of our patent system from a fresh perspective based on 
economics and simple common sense. 
Patent lawyers and business people who rely on the present system 
all know its fundamental purpose: to create economic incentives for 
technical innovation when needed.  Yet most of them spend their lives 
wholly immersed in the legal and procedural details of procuring and 
enforcing patents and the technological details of proving that the 
subject matter they want to control deserves a patent.  They seldom have 
the occasion or the incentive to reflect on how the law and procedure on 
which they work daily affects the operation of the general economy.  
They have not the time or inclination, nor the motive, to take a fresh 
look at our patent system, as it operates today, to see whether it makes 
sense. 
Enter Alice.  Like most patent lawyers, Alice believes passionately 
in the value of intellectual property.  Although still young, she is widely 
read.  She knows that the Chinese made three of the most important 
inventions in human history: noodles, printing, and gunpowder.  She 
also knows that, in the second millennium, Western culture surpassed 
the Chinese in technical innovation so soundly that virtually all the great 
technical inventions of the twentieth century were made in the West, and 
virtually none in China.  Alice believes firmly that this difference had 
nothing to do with race or culture and everything to do with economic 
law.  Western culture, she thinks, had developed the notion of 
intellectual property—economic incentives for innovation—while 
Chinese culture appears until recently to have clung to the notion of free 
appropriability of ideas, as exemplified in Imperial times by the slogan 
“To steal a book is an elegant offense.”24 
In this strong belief in the value and necessity of intellectual 
 
 24. Professor Alford describes this slogan as “a Chinese saying of unknown provenance.”   
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 1 (1995). 
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property protection, Alice concurs with most U.S. patent lawyers.  She 
differs from many of them, however, in three important ways.  First, as 
the conception of an Englishman,25 Alice naturally knows well the 
Statute of Monopolies.  Just as strongly as she believes in the value of 
intellectual property, she believe that this venerable statute sets out the 
proper economic relationship between free competition in free markets 
and intellectual-property protection: that of rule and exception.  Second, 
as the daughter of a mathematician,26 Alice recognizes that economics is 
quantitative branch of science.  Accordingly, she believes that whatever 
economic law decrees, it must make sense in terms of numbers and 
measurable economic effect.  Finally, as the daughter of a logician,27 
Alice believes that all law—especially economic law—should make 
basic common sense.  At very least, she thinks, it should answer the 
most obvious logical questions clearly and well. 
II.  WHAT’S WRONG WITH OUR SYSTEM NOW? 
So how would our Alice approach the United States patent system?  
What question would she ask first?  Undoubtedly the first question that 
would occur to her would be “what things are patentable?”  What types 
of things, she would ask, deserve the special incentive of a state-granted 
monopoly that, despite the four-century-old prohibition against 
monopoly, remove them from the general rule of free competition in free 
markets? 
After diligent study, I think Alice would be disappointed with the 
answer that our current patent system gives to that question.  She would 
consider it a bad answer in two respects.  First, the answer is not very 
clear.  Second, to the extent it is clear, is doesn’t make much economic 
sense.  The answer is not clear because it depends in large measure upon 
abstractions so airy that they are worthy of medieval scholars.28  It 
 
 25. Alice’s creator was an Englishman named Rev. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, a 
mathematician and logician who lectured at Oxford for some 26 years.  His pen name was Lewis 
Carroll.  See “The Making of Alice in Wonderland,” available at 
http://www.bedtime-story.com/bedtime-story/alice-background.htm (last visited June 23, 2004). 
 26. See supra note 25. 
 27. See id. 
      28.   The chief culprit here is the requirement that patentable inventions not be “obvious” in 
light of prior art.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004).   Properly understood, this requirement is part of the 
subject-matter limitation of patent law, not an extraneous criterion.  See infra the text accompanying 
notes 35-47.  But what criterion could possibly be more abstract and evanescent—and more 
dependent on the eye of the beholder—than whether something is “obvious”? 
         In addition, a judge-made rule excludes from patentability “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas[.]”  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).  Since computer 
programming came on the scene as an independent industry in 1968, the courts have tried in vain 
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doesn’t make economic sense because those abstractions have little, if 
anything, to do with the economic impact of patent monopolies or the 
dividing line between prohibited monopolies on businesses and 
permitted temporary monopoly on inventions.29 
The State Street decision exemplifies the problem.  As State Street 
marvelously illustrates, the PTO is issuing, and the courts are upholding, 
patents on too many things that are not “inventions” in any way that 
makes economic sense.  Furthermore, they are allowing alleged 
inventors to claim such non-inventions so broadly that their patents, in 
effect, give them business monopolies of the type that have been 
prohibited in Anglo-American law since the English Parliament enacted 
the Statute of Monopolies in 1623. 
 
trying to apply this rule—itself highly abstract—to alleged software-related inventions.  See DARCY 
ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 841-42 & n.6 (citing six failed attempts to define the judge-made 
exception for such inventions and concluding: “In addressing software-related innovations, the 
courts have tried and rejected so many formulas that the list appears endless.”); 1 DRATLER, supra 
note 1, at § 2.02[2][b] (outlining judicial history in more detail). 
         In State Street and an earlier case, the Federal Circuit tried to cabin the rule by distinguishing 
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from inventions that produce a “useful, 
concrete and tangible result[,]” meaning numbers that one can use.  State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 
1373, quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc majority opinion).  This attempt, however, had two signal flaws.  First, it confused the question 
of patentable subject matter with the distinct statutory requirement than a patentable invention be 
“useful” as specified in 35 U.S.C. § 101.  See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 891 & n.218.  
Second and more important, it made the distinction between rule and exception “clear” by virtually 
extinguishing the exception.  See infra note 47.  In defining anything that produces useful numbers 
as “concrete” and not “abstract,” the Federal Circuit virtually assured that no viable subject-matter 
objection could be made to software related inventions.  General Gordius, who cut the eponymous 
Gordian knot, would approve. 
        29.    To my knowledge, no one has ever succeeded in articulating a direct relationship between 
the criterion of nonobviousness in cognition and any economic effect of the patent system (or the 
appropriate balance between the prohibition on business monopolies and the exception for 
temporally limited monopolies on inventions).  As for the highly abstract distinction between 
abstract natural laws, phenomena and ideas on the one hand and concrete inventions on the other, 
modern understanding of the physical world has all but erased its significance.  Computer programs 
are just abstract steps or instructions coded in ways established by human convention, yet they are 
the basis of virtually all modern business operations, as well as much in science and engineering.  
Moreover, the very basis of life is now understood to be abstract information contained in genetic 
sequences of amino-acids.  This coalescence of abstract information with business and engineering 
operations and the practical characteristics of living organisms has made distinguishing the abstract 
from the concrete in patent law a fool’s errand. 
         The usual rationale for this judge-made exception to patentable subject matter is that the tools 
of science, engineering and invention, as distinguished from inventions themselves, are too valuable 
and widely applicable to monopolize.  See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2][b][iv][F].  But this 
distinction becomes evanescent when both tools and results are expressed in abstractions, such as 
steps in a computer program or process or blocks of abstract information in a genetic code.  In any 
event, the distinction has no economic relevance besides the obvious observation that keeping basic 
tools free from monopoly likely will result in more of what those tools build (in this case invention).  
Modern science and technology, which recognize that abstract sequences (of computer instructions 
or pairs of amino acids) are both the tools of invention and its results, demands a more economically 
relevant criterion for line-drawing. 
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To give the Federal Circuit and the PTO their due, both of these 
defects relate to fundamental line-drawing problems that, in the entire 
history of patents, have never been satisfactorily resolved.  The first is 
the question “what is an invention?” or, in legal terms, “what subject 
matter is properly patentable”?  The second is how broadly an inventor 
may claim what he has invented, i.e., to what extent his patent will cover 
things that are similar in concept, result, or method but not exactly the 
same.  The answers to these questions seem perhaps the most important 
aspects of any patent system from an economic perspective, for they 
determine what otherwise unlawful monopolies the state may grant and 
how far those monopolies may extend in impairing others’ economic 
liberty, i.e., others’ freedom to innovate and to compete.  Let us 
examine, from Alice’s fresh perspective, how the current U.S. patent 
systems handles these vital issues. 
A.  Patentable Subject Matter 
Over the course of nearly four centuries,30 the subject-matter 
inquiry has undergone a certain evolution in semantics.  Yet it has 
reached no conceptual resolution that makes self-evident economic 
sense.  Part of the problem is that the issue of subject matter relates to, 
and is often confused with, the other requirements for patentable 
inventions. 
In 1623, the English Parliament approved, as an exception to the 
Statute of Monopolies, patents for “new Manufactures within this 
Realm[.]”31 Besides introducing the separate requirement of 
“novelty”32—a universal requirement for patent protection today33—this 
formulation limited patents to “Manufactures.”  If our own patent statute 
contained only that word, it might, for example, have eliminated the 
 
 30. The Statute of Monopolies, which contained an exception for patents, was enacted in 
England in 1623. STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8. 
 31. STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, § 6 (permitting, as exception to general 
prohibition on monopolies in § 2, letters patent for the term of fourteen years or less, of the sole 
working or making of any manner of new manufactures, to the true and first inventor). 
 32. Id.  Under the limited exception to the general anti-monopoly rule, the subject of a patent 
had to be a “new” manufacture, granted to the “true and first Inventor” thereof, for something which 
“others at the tyme of makinge such Lettres Patents . . . shall not use [sic] [.]” Id. 
 33. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2004) (prescribing and describing novelty requirement, 
respectively, in the United States).  See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
[hereinafter WTO AGREEMENT], Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 
31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 27.1 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS AGREEMENT] (requiring of member nations 
that their patents be limited to inventions that are “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application”) (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
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hub-and-spoke investment partnership in State Street on the ground that 
it was a service and not a “manufacture.”  Clever lawyers, however, 
would of course argue (as indeed the State Street patentee did)34 that the 
programmed computer used to manage the partnership was a 
“manufacture,” thereby circumventing the limitation.  And indeed, it is 
hard to distinguish, on a general and abstract basis, a programmed digital 
computer that performs novel functions by virtue of new programming 
from other novel machines or manufactures.  For these and similar 
reasons, attempts at line drawing based on the meanings of words like 
“manufacture” or “technology” have generally been fruitless.35 
Thomas Jefferson made some progress in line drawing by 
recognizing that merely being “new” is not enough.  As a prolific 
inventor himself and the father of our patent system,36 he insured that 
our very first patent statute required patentable inventions, inter alia, to 
be “sufficiently useful and important[.]”37  The historical record bears 
ample witness to his reasons for doing so: he feared the monopolistic 
effect or “embarrassment” of patents if too liberally granted.38 
Over time, Jefferson’s verbal formulation evolved successively into 
(1) a requirement for more than the skill of an ordinary mechanic,39 (2) 
“invention,” meaning an undefined quality of inventiveness,40 and 
finally (3) the criterion of nonobviousness that we have today under 
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952.41 
No apparent substantive change was intended in any of this 
semantic evolution.42  Rather, each successive formulation was an 
 
 34. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375-76. 
 35. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 836-38, 843-46, for further discussion of this point. 
 36. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966) (describing Jefferson’s 
role and attitudes in helping structure our patent system and, as Secretary of State, in serving as one 
of three officials who superintended its operation). 
 37. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790) (allowing any two of Secretary of 
State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General to issue patent if they found “the invention or 
discovery sufficiently useful and important”) (emphasis added in text). 
 38. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (noting Jefferson’s recognition of difficulty of “drawing a line 
between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and 
those which are not” (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), 
reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, John C. 
Riker 1857))). 
 39. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850). 
 40. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 11-12 (describing evolution in meaning of term “invention” to 
describe, but not resolve, line-drawing problem in interval between Hotchkiss and Patent Act of 
1952). 
 41. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004) (precluding patent if, inter alia, “the subject matter [of the 
invention] as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art”) (emphasis added). 
 42. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 12-17 (reviewing history of 1952 Act and concluding that it 
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attempt to better articulate a criterion for distinguishing innovations that, 
although technically new, were not the sort that justified the economic 
harm of a state-granted monopoly, albeit for a limited term. 
As is apparent from this brief review, however, this semantic 
evolution failed to solve the line-drawing problem.  In some respects, it 
failed even to ask the right question.  As Thomas Jefferson apparently 
understood, and as our Alice would appreciate, the basic question is an 
economic one: which innovations justify the negative social and 
economic effects that inevitably flow, according to economic science, 
from any monopoly,43 especially one granted and protected by the 
awesome power of the State?  The more recent historical formulations—
more skill than an ordinary mechanic’s, “invention” (meaning 
inventiveness), and nonobviousness—missed the point because they 
appeared to focus on the mental qualities and capacity of the inventor 
and her leap of imagination.  Yet these factors have little to do with the 
fundamental economic problem.  Thomas Jefferson’s first formulation 
“sufficiently useful and important” got the right idea, but it wasn’t very 
specific. 
In 1966, the Supreme Court, in a seminal decision construing the 
meaning of obviousness, finally asked the economically relevant 
question.  The issue, it said, was how to distinguish innovations that 
would not be made but for the incentive of a limited patent monopoly 
from those that would be made anyway.44 This important conceptual 
breakthrough was vital for economic clarity; it was the first since 
Jefferson’s to recognize, at least implicitly, that patents can actually do 
economic harm if they are granted when they are not needed.  Alice 
would undoubtedly appreciate this restatement as a giant step toward 
common sense. 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence actually 
has “taught away” (to use patent jargon) from this beginning of a 
solution to the line-drawing problem.  Instead of trying to solve the line-
drawing problem, that court has largely tried to ignore it, substituting 
formalism for probing judgment.45  It has all but ruled that anything 
fairly described by one or more of the laundry list of nouns in Section 
 
“was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention”). 
 43. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 823-25 (discussing several consequences—
principally higher prices, reduced output, and lower innovation, of monopoly as compared to an 
equivalent competitive market). 
 44. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 11 (“The inherent problem was to develop some means of 
weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a 
patent.”). 
 45. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 876-894, for further discussion of this point. 
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10146 is patentable subject matter, regardless of any economic need for 
or adverse effect of the patent.47  In relying so heavily on that list of 
nouns (which contains the word “manufacture” drawn from the statute of 
monopolies)48 the court has reverted to the formalistic, semantic games 
that Jefferson had apparently tried to avoid by his more probing 
formulation in our very first patent statute.  In other words, the Federal 
Circuit appears to have foreclosed any substantive inquiry into the 
balance between monopoly (which nearly always has a negative 
economic effect) and the need for incentives for innovation that justifies 
a temporary monopoly. 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has all but eliminated the 
nonobviousness criterion—the modern successor to Jefferson’s 
“sufficiently . . . important” language.  It has done so by interpreting that 
criterion as requiring “suggestions” in published references49 and 
therefore as little more than the separate “novelty” requirement.50  In the 
attached article I outline in much more detail precisely how the court has 
done so,51 and I won’t repeat that argument here.  Suffice it to say that 
the FTC, in its White Paper, also concluded that the Federal Circuit’s 
“suggestion” test may be anticompetitive and counterproductive without 
 
 46. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added). 
 47. See, e.g., State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (“The repetitive use of the expansive term ‘any’ 
in § 101 shows Congress’s intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a 
patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 
1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“Because claim 15 is directed to a ‘machine,’ which is one 
of the four categories of patentable subject matter enumerated in § 101, claim 15 appears on its face 
to be directed to § 101 subject matter.”).  In both cases, the Federal Circuit of course addressed the 
judge-made exceptions to patentable subject matter for abstract ideas and laws of nature, but in 
reducing them to their narrowest, most literal scope—and in confusing them with a lack of utility—
the court deprived them of all vitality.  See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 887-891, 890 n.218. 
 48. See supra note 46 and the text accompanying note 31. 
 49. See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
“relevant inquiry” is “whether there is a reason, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art or 
elsewhere that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references”); In re 
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (requiring “rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or 
motivation to combine prior art references”), rev’d on other grounds.  See generally DRATLER, 
supra note 1, § 2.03[3][f] (discussing Federal Circuit’s “suggestion test” for obviousness). 
 50. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 882-83.  Under the doctrine of “complete 
anticipation,” patent law requires a single prior-art reference to render an invention non-novel.  Id. 
(discussing doctrine and citing authority).  The Federal Circuit’s “suggestion” test for obviousness, 
which permits combining more than a single reference but generally requires something explicit in 
each, therefore requires little more than novelty as a nonlawyer would understand it, i.e., something 
not described in any combination of prior-art references.  See id. at 883-85. 
 51. See id. at 882-91. 
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substantial modification.52 
Thus, the Federal Circuit, ignoring patent law’s strong foundation 
in economics and policy, effectively has read the subject-matter and 
nonobviousness requirements out of the patent code.  It therefore should 
be no surprise that two of the FTC’s key recommendations are to 
resurrect the subject-matter inquiry, with due consideration for antitrust 
principles,53 and to restore the nonobviousness criterion to at least a 
shadow of its former robustness with probing judgment not entirely 
dependent on explicit “suggestions” in the prior art.54  Alice would no 
doubt applaud these suggestions. 
The tragedy of this excessive formalism, which gave us patents like 
that in State Street, is that economic theory now provides a much better 
basis for answering the question that the Supreme Court posed in 
Graham: how to distinguish innovations whose development require the 
patent incentive from those that do not.  The theory is neither new nor 
controversial; it is basic entrepreneurial risk-reward theory. 
As I’ve explained in more detail in the attached article,55 the 
analysis goes as follows.  Risk-reward theory teaches that, in order to 
motivate firms to take business risk, we must offer them a potential 
reward proportionate to the risk.56  This theory is well-accepted and 
noncontroversial; it explains such diverse phenomena as interest rates 
for bonds of varying terms, issued by firms with various prospects, and 
the relatively high prices of speculative technology stocks.  Potential 
reward, it says, must bear a direct relationship to the level of risk 
undertaken and the chance of failure. 
Now, as Alice would recognize, every new business venture has 
some risk of failure.  A haberdasher takes a risk in expanding its product 
line into toiletries.  A supermarket or bank takes a risk in building a new 
branch in a new suburb or in a formerly blighted inner-city 
neighborhood where no such branch currently exists.  A funeral home 
takes a risk in offering a new program of prepaid funerals with 
installment financing.  In each of these ventures, there is substantial risk 
of consumer nonacceptance, which Alice would call market risk. 
Yet we don’t grant patents for these ventures.  Rather, we consider 
 
 52. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 11-12 (recommending modification of the 
“suggestion” test); id. at 9-11 (analyzing deficiencies of test). 
 53. See id. at 14-15 (recommending consideration of anticompetitive and other harm before 
“extending the scope of patentable subject matter”). 
 54. See supra notes 49-50. 
 55. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 840-53. 
 56. See JOHN CRAVEN, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 248 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1984). 
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the risk that they undertake to be ordinary business risk.  We therefore 
subject them to the rigors of free competition and the Sherman Act’s 
absolute prohibition against monopolies, derived from the old English 
Statute of Monopolies. 
With her knowledge of the Statute and her firm belief in its 
rightness and balance, Alice would pose a burning question: “What 
makes business ventures involving patentable inventions and their 
development different from ordinary business ventures that must suffer 
the rule of free competition?”  To answer this question, she might 
consider the paradigmatic patent-driven industry: pharmaceuticals.  
Recent figures are startling.57 They suggest that the “fully loaded” cost 
of developing a single new pharmaceutical molecule, taking it though 
laboratory and clinical trials, and securing FDA approval for its 
marketing is today about $800 million58 (including the cost of project 
failures).59  Furthermore, fewer than one in five drug candidates that 
make it out of the laboratory survive this tortuous process and reach the 
marketplace in the form of FDA-approved pharmaceuticals.60 
Thus, as drug firms enter the clinical testing phase, they must play a 
game of high-stakes roulette.  They must ante up several hundred million 
dollars for each new drug, and their chances of taking it to market are 
one in five.  Moreover, their risk is not market risk, i.e., the risk of 
consumer nonacceptance.  It is a risk that the results of their research 
simply will not work, either at all or with enough safety and 
effectiveness to satisfy the panels of experts that advise the FDA and 
justify marketing to the public.  The risk they face is thus not market 
 
 57. The most recent industry figures suggest that development costs for a single successful 
drug may be as high as $1.7 billion.  See Drug Development Costs Rise to $1.7 Billion, Study Finds, 
Drug Industry Daily, Dec. 9, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, DRGDLY.  This paper, 
however, relies on a slightly less recent and accepted independent study by Dr. Joseph A. DiMasi at 
Tufts University’s Center for the Study of Drug Development, which put the full cost of drug 
development at $800 million.  See Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, News Release: 
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 
Million (Nov. 30, 2001), at http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6 (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter TUFTS NEWS RELEASE]. 
 58. See TUFTS NEWS RELEASE, supra note 57. 
 59. See TUFTS NEWS RELEASE, supra note 57.  The $800 million figure includes “expenses of 
project failures and the impact that long development times have on investment costs.”  Id. 
 60. See Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy and availability: Patents and 
New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC 
POL’Y REV. 7, 9 (2003) (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical 
Testing in the United States, 58 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 1-14 (1995)).  
The author stated that, “[t]ypically, many thousands of compounds are examined in the pre-clinical 
period for every one that makes it into human testing.”  Id.  “Only 20 percent of the compounds 
entering clinical trials survive the development process and gain FDA approval[.]”  Id. 
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risk, but technological risk, i.e., the risk that their project will fall 
entirely and that they will lose their sunk investment, for reasons other 
than market acceptance.61 
With the pharmaceutical industry as a paradigm, Alice would 
understand the economic rationale for patents.  Without patent 
protection, an innovating firm’s rival could copy and market the 
innovator’s successful drug without incurring the $800 million cost of 
development.  Of course, the copyist would have to incur the cost of 
building and operating a manufacturing plant, but so does the 
innovator.62 Because the copyist can avoid the additional high cost of 
innovation, as well as much of the costs of marketing and promotion,63 it 
can afford to sell the drug at a lower price than the innovator.  Its entry 
into the market will either drive the innovator out or prevent the 
innovator from recovering its enormous development cost.  As other 
firms learn these “rules of the game,” they will channel their investment 
out of risky innovation and into safe copying.  Only patent protection 
can make the innovator’s substantial investment in development and 
clinical testing economically rational and stem the “flight of capital” 
from innovation to copying.64   
All this would make eminent sense to innovators seeking to recover 
their cost of innovating.  The direct, sunk cost of innovation, however, is 
only half the story; the other half is risk.  Even if a third party (such as 
the government) guaranteed to repay the innovator’s development and 
clinical-testing expenses for a successful product, Alice would still 
wonder whether innovation would be a rational act.  The reason is risk.  
Since only one in five products succeeds, guaranteeing reimbursement 
for the development costs of successful products would not make the 
innovator whole.  It would still be out the cost of all those products that 
failed in the process of development.  Only patent protection, with its 
 
 61. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 840-51 for further discussion of the distinction 
between market and technological risk. 
 62. The copyist might also have to incur some additional expense to convince the FDA that its 
manufacturing process was as safe and reliable as the innovator’s. 
 63. As long as the law allows the copyist to market its copycat drug, the law should not 
prevent it from truly describing that drug as an exact copy.  The copyist could even use the 
innovator’s trademark to identify its copy (truthfully) as a duplicate of the innovator’s drug.  See 
DRATLER, supra note 1, § 10.04 (discussing doctrine of trademark fair use).  As a result, the copyist 
could “free ride” on the innovator’s marketing and promotion expenses, as well as on its 
development and clinical-testing costs. 
 64. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 842-43.  See also Grabowski, supra note 60, at 11 
(“Without a well-structured system of global patent protection, neither the research pharmaceutical 
industry nor the generic industry would be able to grow and prosper, and the rate of new product 
introductions and patent expirations would decline significantly.”). 
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potentially unlimited reward arising out of exclusive rights in successful 
innovation, can provide a potential reward high enough to justify this 
risk.65 
Alice therefore would see two key economic issues that patents in 
patent-driven industries address: (1) recoupment of the innovator’s sunk 
costs of innovation, and (2) compensation for the risk that development 
will be unsuccessful and that those sunk costs will be a total loss.  
Moreover, patent-driven industries differ in the nature of that risk from 
other business ventures: the risk that they take is a risk of total loss for 
reasons other than market acceptance. 
As this example of the pharmaceutical industry shows, patent-
driven industries have an important characteristic that ordinary business 
ventures do not share.  They incur substantial development costs, and 
those costs are at risk of total loss for technological reasons, i.e., for 
reasons other than market or consumer acceptance.  With her 
theoretical and economic bent, Alice would be sure that this vital 
difference is something any rational patent system should recognize and 
reflect. 
With further thought, Alice might conclude that this point—
substantial development cost at nonmarket risk of total failure—serves 
as a useful economic criterion for patentable subject matter.66 As such, it 
has three key advantages over previous tests.  First, it addresses directly 
the relevant and probing economic question that the Supreme Court 
asked in Graham: what innovations require the incentive of patent 
protection?  Second, it relies not on mere abstractions, but on well-
understood economic theory with visible, common-sense application in 
the real world.67 Finally, it avoids the semantic line-drawing and empty 
formalism that attends trying to determine what is a “manufacture” or 
what is “technology.”  For the risk criterion depends not upon the nature, 
function or operation of the invention, but on the nature of the economic 
risk, if any, incurred in developing it. 
Alice might wonder what would change if the PTO and the courts 
 
 65. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 843-53, for further discussion of this point.  See 
also 1 DRATLER, supra note 2, § 3.02[1] (discussing exclusive rights and running royalties as means 
to extract potentially unlimited reward from marketplace and thereby to justify unknown and 
unknowable development risk). 
 66. See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 844-53. 
 67. See supra notes 57, 60.  Real economic risk can be demonstrated by such evidence as 
expert testimony, historical and statistical records of similar projects, and the record in the actual 
development project at issue, including false starts, blind alleys, and development and/or testing 
expense incurred without tangible result.  In other words, courts can rely on exactly the same sort of 
evidence compiled in studies such as those cited in notes 57 and 60.  Id. 
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applied this common-sense criterion for patentable subject matter.  After 
reflection, she would no doubt conclude that much in our present patent 
system would change.  First and foremost, the troublesome 
nonobviousness criterion would not be necessary and could be dispensed 
with.  After all, that criterion, properly understood, is historically and 
functionally just a proxy for proper subject matter.68  As the Graham 
Court recognized, it is aimed at distinguishing inventions that justify, in 
Jefferson’s words, the “embarrassment of an exclusive patent” from 
those that do not.  By solving the subject-matter line-drawing problem 
based on actual economic effect, not formalism, the nonmarket-risk-of-
total-failure criterion would obviate the need for nonobviousness 
determinations, with all their abstract legal hairsplitting. 
The risk criterion also would simplify patent litigation in yet 
another respect.  By focusing on economic and business matters like 
sunk investment and risk of failure, it would relieve one of the most 
troublesome sources of judicial chagrin and error in patent cases: most 
judges’ lack of familiarity with science and technology.69  No longer 
would judges without technical backgrounds have to understand the 
underlying technology sufficiently to judge whether an alleged 
innovation involves a concrete invention, on the one hand, or a “law of 
nature” or “abstract idea” on the other.70  Instead, they would have only 
to understand enough to evaluate the credibility and weight of expert 
testimony whether there was real nonmarket risk of total failure and loss 
when the development project began.  The result would be to make 
patent law much less of an obscure field dependent on the intricacies of 
technical specialties, and much more a field of economic law accessible 
to legally-trained minds with some understanding of business and 
economics.  If nothing else, such a change would both reflect and assist 
patent law’s increasing importance in the new global economic order. 
Of course, this criterion would reduce the number of patents 
granted and upheld, perhaps by a considerable margin.  No longer would 
the PTO issue new patents, for example, for hundreds of variations of 
 
 68. See supra text accompanying ns. 35-45. 
 69. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).  No less a 
distinguished figure in American jurisprudence than Judge (later Justice) Story lamented that 
“[p]atents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic 
discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least 
may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”  Id. at 344. 
 70. These are two of the three (themselves abstract) terms that define the traditional judge-
made exceptions to patentable subject matter.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) 
(“Excluded from . . . patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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circuit breakers distinguished from each other only through the use of 
slightly different semiconductors (invented by others) or slightly 
different circuitry.  Minor improvements of patented inventions, 
developed in projects with little risk of failure, would be unpatentable no 
matter how “nonobvious” their methods of operation might seem, in the 
abstract, to judge or jury after the fact. 
This change, however, would not remove the present patent 
statute’s salubrious prohibition against hindsight.71 Rather, it would 
require the risk of failure to be assessed as of the beginning of a research 
or development project, not after its successful conclusion. 
This change might, however, require reassessment of the sentence 
in current Section 103 that precludes considering how an invention was 
made.72  If an invention’s manner of making entails no real economic 
risk—for example, if a mechanical device, conceived in a sudden 
inspiration, works the first time it is built—then there is no reason to 
provide a patent monopoly.  No matter how brilliant the conception, 
there is nothing economically to distinguish such an invention from any 
ordinary business project, such as opening a branch of a bank or 
supermarket in a new neighborhood.  The new criterion would, however, 
still allow some results of serendipity to be patented.  For example, 
Charles Goodyear’s fortuitous discovery of how to vulcanize rubber 
would probably still be patentable because it took a lot of work, and 
involved a lot of economic risk, to turn the lump of goo on his stove into 
a commercially viable process for making rubber tires. 
If Alice read the well-known decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 
Inc.,73 she might wonder whether the court focused on the right 
economic issue.  As virtually every patent lawyer knows, the Supreme 
Court in Pfaff addressed the application of the one-year statutory “on 
sale” bar under Section 102(b) of the patent act.74  It affirmed a holding 
 
 71. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004) (precluding patent if invention “would have been obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art”) (emphasis added).  
For a discussion of the effect of this statutory phrase in precluding invalidation of patents by 
hindsight, see 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.03[3][a]. 
 72. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004) (“Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in 
which the invention was made.”). 
 73. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).  See also DRATLER, supra note 1, at § 
2.03[1][b][ii]. 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 102: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 
* * * 
(b)  the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or 
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one 
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States[.] 
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that the patent was invalid because the invention at issue—a socket for 
electronic components—had been placed on sale before the critical date, 
even though it had not then been reduced to practice.75  But Alice might 
wonder why the case ever got to that point.  Shouldn’t courts, she might 
ask, logically address the most fundamental issues first?  And isn’t the 
most fundamental issue whether the claimed invention is patentable 
subject matter, i.e., whether it is the type of innovation for which a 
patent monopoly is economically justified? 
As Alice looked at the simple socket at issue in Pfaff, she would 
have grave doubts whether its development entailed the sort of non-
market risk of total failure that justifies a state-granted monopoly.  She 
would note that the purported inventor, in testimony reproduced in a 
footnote, described a business in which he routinely cranked out such 
sockets by making drawings, ordering tooling, and beginning 
production, without so much as developing a prototype, and apparently 
without any experimentation at all.76  She might laugh at the inventor’s 
own description of his production process as “Boom-Boom.”77  Alice 
would scratch her head, wondering how a business that routinely 
cranked out socked after socket “Boom-Boom” could claim the 
technological risk that is the raison d’etre of patent protection. 
As the Pfaff case so well illustrates, computer-program and 
business-method patents are not the sole examples of patent protection 
that makes little economic sense.  As Alice studied the U.S. patent 
system in greater detail, she would no doubt come across many patents 
that seemed less validations of meritorious undertaking of technological 
risk and more gratuitous exemptions from the general rule of the Statute 
of Monopolies: that economies work best when private businesses 
compete fairly and freely. 
As for theory, Alice would no doubt view the long history and 
evolution of what is now the “nonobvious” criterion with disappointed 
bemusement.  With her training in logic, she would recognize right away 
that that criterion was supposed from the beginning to serve as a proxy 
for valid subject matter, separate and apart from the criterion of novelty 
that has been part of every patent statute since the Statute of 
Monopolies.  She would scratch her head in wonderment at the notion 
that anyone would choose “nonobviousness” as an economic test.  What 
does cognitional difficulty, she would ask, have to do with any relevant 
 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 75. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66, 68-69. 
 76. See id. at 58 n.3. 
 77. See id. 
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economic factor?  And aren’t mental and cognitional criteria, like state 
of mind, the hardest things to measure and prove in practice?  Wouldn’t 
it make much more sense, she might think, to focus on the technological 
risk that entrepreneurs take in developing their innovations—something 
that has direct economic relevance and can be measured and proven by 
normal economic and evidentiary techniques? 
Reviewing the history of this subject-matter proxy, Alice would 
probably see the Hotchkiss decision in 185178 as a tragically missed 
opportunity.  If only the Court had changed one word, from the “skill” 
an ordinary mechanic79 to the “risk” assumed by an ordinary mechanic, 
she might think, it might have advanced the cause of economically 
rational patent law by more than a century. 
III.  THE BREADTH OF CLAIMS 
The second most important question that our Alice would address, 
after distinguishing inventions for which patent monopolies are 
economically beneficial from those for which it is not, would involve the 
breadth of a patent’s claims.  Once an invention is proved worthy of an 
exception from the general rule of free competition in business, Alice 
would ask, how much does or should the patent on it cover?  
Unfortunately, the FTC’s White Paper does not directly address this 
issue, although it has been historically one of the most contentious in our 
patent law. 
Current patent law addresses this line-drawing problem under two 
separate doctrines, which—at least to some extent—pull in different 
directions.  The first doctrine is essentially a rule of invalidation.  If the 
claims are too broad for the specification, i.e., if they are not supported 
by the drawings and detailed description in the patent (apart from the 
claims),80 the claims are invalid.81  This “claim only what you’ve 
disclosed” doctrine technically involves four different types of 
 
 78. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267. 
 79. See id.  (stating that “unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method . . . were 
required in the application of it [in the claimed invention] than were possessed by an ordinary 
mechanic acquainted with the business,” the invention was not patentable.).  Id. 
 80. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004).  The statute defines the “specification” as the patent narrative 
including the claims.  Id. (stating that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims . . .”) (emphasis added).  Yet both practitioners and courts are in the habit of referring to the 
“specification” as the part of the patent other than the claims, especially the narrative description of 
the invention and the drawings. 
 81. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1] (discussing four different legal disclosure 
requirements—enablement, best mode, written description, and definiteness—and the rule that 
failure to satisfy any one invalidates the patent). 
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disclosure—enablement, best mode, written description, and 
definiteness82—but for economic purposes we can lump them together. 
As long as the disclosure adequately supports the claims made, the 
second doctrine comes into play.  The doctrine of equivalents broadens 
the reach of the claims to “equivalents” of what they literally describe.83 
The Federal Circuit disfavors the notion that this doctrine “broadens” the 
claims, but that is the effect of what it does.84  It allows a patentee that 
cannot claim literal infringement to win an infringement suit although 
the patent’s claims do not literally describe what the defendant does.85 
A.  What is the Problem? 
After reflection, our Alice would no doubt find this two-doctrine 
system quite odd, especially from an economic perspective.  Of course a 
patentee has every incentive to draft claims as broadly as possible, since 
the claims determine the scope of the legal monopoly that the patent 
provides.86  But the courts have no power or method to contain the 
results of that incentive by narrowing the claims.87  A court can only 
invalidate claims or validate them and (under the doctrine of 
equivalents) extend them.  Patent examiners have some power to narrow 
claims by rejecting and renegotiating their scope in the course of patent 
 
 82. See id.  See also id. § 2.04[1][a], [b], [d], [f] (discussing each disclosure requirement 
separately and citing authority). 
 83. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-29 (1997) 
(reconfirming vitality of doctrine of equivalents against challenges based on Patent Act of 1952); 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (stating that an accused 
device is equivalent to the claimed invention “if it performs substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 
280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929))); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 334 (1854) (providing the 
seminal decision on doctrine of equivalents). 
 84. See Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“As we recently acknowledged in Streamfeeder, the doctrine of equivalents does not operate 
to ‘broaden’ claims, but rather broadens the right to exclude.  For the sake of convenience, however, 
we will likewise use these terms here, ‘cognizant of the fact that it is the right to exclude which is 
being expanded, not the claims.’” (quoting Streamfeeder, LLC v. Mailing Mach. Serv., Inc., 175 
F.3d 974, 981 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Of course applying the doctrine of equivalents does not 
literally rewrite the claims, but it does give them the practical effect of claims, hypothetical or 
otherwise, with broader scope than their literal language commands. 
 85. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][b][i] (discussing doctrine of equivalents in 
depth). 
 86. See id. § 2.05[3][a] (introduction), [i] (discussing claims as determining scope of patent 
monopoly). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2004).  The patentee can narrow the claims in reissue, if excessive 
breadth was due to “error without any deceptive intention[.]”  Id.  The courts, however, have no 
power to narrow the claims at all. 
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prosecution88 but, once a patent issues, courts do not have that option. 
Under the current patent system, courts thus have no legal basis for 
making a truly independent judgment about what the patentee actually 
invented and how far that invention extends.  When they construe the 
claims, they are stuck with what the patentee wrote and may only 
invalidate or accept it.89 When they apply the claims, courts can expand 
their application under the doctrine of equivalents, but they cannot 
narrow them.  Thus, courts have only the Hobson’s choice of approving 
an overbroad claim or invalidating it. 
Alice would find this Hobson’s choice quite odd.  It precludes 
courts from making an independent judgment on what appears, from an 
economic point of view, to be one of the most important questions for 
any patent: what did the inventor contribute to the art and how far did 
her contribution extend?   
The seminal case of O’Reilly v. Morse90 is a good example.  Morse, 
who invented the telegraph, drafted and got the PTO to grant an eighth 
claim covering every means of using electromagnetism for 
telecommunication.91  Of course, he hadn’t invented every means; he 
had only invented the telegraph.  The Supreme Court invalidated this 
claim on the ground that it was simply too broad,92 and of course it was 
right in so doing.  Morse’s eighth claim would have covered, among 
other things, telephone, radio, television, microwave, wireless, and 
Internet communication, although they were all invented by others much 
later. 
The Federal Circuit has interpreted Morse as based on an 
inadequate disclosure: Morse didn’t disclose all means of 
telecommunicating by electromagnetic energy in his patent.93  But 
 
 88. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 1.06[1] (describing patent prosecution procedure). 
The Patent and Trademark Office may also narrow claims in re-examination, after a patent has 
issued, but that process requires an external request or sua sponte action by the Office and is subject 
to judicial review.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-318 (2004). 
 89. See id.  Courts can and do interpret the claims, but they are bound by the claim language, 
for the present system puts the burden of describing the legal limits of the invention on the patent 
applicant, aided by the patent examiner.  See also id. at § 2.05[3][a] (discussing rules and 
procedures by which courts construe patent claims in litigation). 
 90. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
 91. See id. at 112 (reciting eighth claim). 
 92. See id. at 113 (stating that the “court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not 
warranted by law”). 
 93. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-715 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  See also id. at 714 (stating that 
“the claim is properly rejected for what used to be known as ‘undue breadth,’ but has since been 
appreciated as being, more accurately, based on the first paragraph of § 112[,]” i.e., lack of an 
enabling and definite disclosure). 
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Morse did disclose one means—the telegraph—and it is black-letter 
patent law that a patent need not disclose every means of achieving the 
ends of every claim.94  Cases are legion that allow inventors to claim 
more than their incomplete disclosures would literally warrant.95  If 
every patentee didn’t have that right, claims would be even more prolix 
than they are today—for they would have to describe explicitly all the 
many embodiments of a broad claim—and patents would be much easier 
to circumvent.96 
So it is no answer to say that Morse didn’t specifically disclose all 
the other means of telecommunication using electromagnetism.  Even 
modern patent practice would not have required him to disclose every 
possible embodiment of his invention.  The real question is a much 
deeper one, which goes far beyond mere formalism: whether the 
invention that Morse made, considered in all of its inventiveness and all 
of its detail, truly encompassed all of the other modes of using 
electromagnetism for telecommunicating that followed.  That is 
inevitably a question of judgment, requiring deep understanding of the 
patented advance, the pre-existing state of the art, and the extent of the 
advance over it.  In other words, it is a question for experts versed in the 
relevant field of technology.  Answering it can never be a matter of mere 
formalism, such as that involved in comparing a disclosure with the 
claims.  Attempting to reduce it to formalism merely avoids the deeper 
issue. 
For purposes of enablement,97 at least, the Federal Circuit has 
developed a legal standard to determine whether a disclosure in the 
 
 94. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][b] (describing cases in which scope of 
claims may extend beyond what patent literally discloses). 
 95. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (stating disclosure of “numerous salts, fuels, and emulsifiers that could form thousands of 
emulsions” useful as blasting agents was enabling, even if some candidates were inoperative, where 
those skilled in art would know how to select components); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502 n.2 
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (validating claims for genus consisting of  “thousands” of catalysts of similar 
chemical formulation, where patent applicant had tested only forty of them, and “some” had not 
worked); Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 871, 875-876 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973) (holding patent on catalytic process covered polymerization of 
polypropylene, although polypropylene was not mentioned in specification). 
 96. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, 2.04[1][a], [b] (discussing these rationales for the law’s 
flexible disclosure requirements). 
 97. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.  One of the four statutory disclosure 
requirements is that the patent specification “enable any person skilled in the art to which [the 
patented invention] pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use [it].”  35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2004).  This is known as the “enablement” requirement, or the requirement for an 
“enabling disclosure.”  See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1][a]. 
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patent specification adequately supports the claims.98  The touchstone of 
that standard is whether verifying that undisclosed but claimed variants 
would work as claimed requires “undue experimentation.”99 
From an economic standpoint, however, Alice would think that this 
distinction between disclosed embodiments and claims misses the point.  
The reason is that the general question of overbreadth involves two 
entirely separate sets of issues.  A first set addresses, inter alia, whether 
the claims and specification adequately describe how to duplicate the 
invention and adequately warn potential infringers what they can and 
cannot lawfully do.100  That set is adequately covered by the enablement, 
definiteness, and other aspects of patent disclosure.101 
But Alice would see a second set of overbreadth issues as much 
more important from an economic standpoint.  It implicates a much 
deeper question: how much coverage should a patent give a legitimate 
inventor who properly discloses what his invention is and how it works?  
Provide too little coverage and patents can be circumventable and 
therefore become devalued or worthless.  Provide too much and you will 
thwart further progress in technology, as well as “inventing around,” and 
the patentee will receive a windfall.  Although the doctrine of 
equivalents at least recognizes the economic problem,102 the Federal 
Circuit apart from that doctrine appears to have studiously avoided 
answering the second question and appears to maintain that American 
patent law does not require it to do so.103 
 
 98. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1][a]. 
 99. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing factors to be considered 
in determining whether experimentation is undue); Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804, 807 
(Board of Patent Appeals Nov. 12, 1982) (explaining rule of reason). 
 100. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1][b].  The “definiteness” requirement for claiming 
boils down to describing the invention definitely in order to allow proper patent prosecution and to 
warn putative infringers precisely what they can and cannot do.  Id. 
 101. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
 102. Strong dissents and the majority opinions in each of two seminal cases recognized the 
tension—inherent in the doctrine of equivalents—between precision in claiming and avoiding 
circumvention of the claims through literalism.  See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. 
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613-614 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that doctrine of equivalents 
obviates statutory requirement for distinct claiming); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 
347 (1854) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (arguing that doctrine of equivalents would undermine 
statutory requirement that patent applicant “particularly specify and point out what he claims as his 
invention”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 n.3 (1997) (noting that the Court’s majorities in both Graver and 
Winans approved doctrine of equivalents despite tension argued in both dissents). 
 103. See supra note 93 and text accompanying notes 92-93.  The Federal Circuit has 
recognized only the formal question: whether what the inventor has disclosed supports his claims.  
Id.  It appears to have refused to address the deeper substantive question: the extent of the inventor’s 
contribution to the art, as reflected in the claims and the specification. 
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To some extent, the history of American patent law bears out its 
view.  Before the mid-nineteenth century, American patent law used so-
called “central claiming,” in which the inventor described what her 
invention was and it was up to the courts to determine the breadth of 
coverage.104  Later American law adopted so-called “peripheral 
claiming,” under which a patent’s claims are supposed not only to 
describe what the invention is, but to convey exactly how it differs from 
the “prior art” and therefore the extent of legal protection warranted.105 
Almost from the beginning, however, the courts saw this aspect of 
peripheral claiming as a trap for the unwary patentee.  A patent’s 
peripheral claims might be circumvented by avoiding their literal 
language but nevertheless taking the essence of the patentee’s invention.  
To avoid this result, the courts used the doctrine of equivalents, which 
allows patents to cover more than just what the claims’ literal language 
describes.106 
Yet the doctrine of equivalents has proved to be just as slippery as 
the notion of central claiming ever had been.  As dissents in two seminal 
cases argued,107 the doctrine undermined the very notion of certainty that 
peripheral claiming was supposed to promote.  So, dissatisfied with the 
expansiveness and uncertainty of the doctrine of equivalents, the courts 
invented prosecution history estoppel to ameliorate its uncertainty.108  
Recently, in Festo, the Federal Circuit attempted to convert that doctrine 
into a largely formal process, based upon claim amendments, only to be 
rebuffed by the Supreme Court.109 
We are now left with a process of determining the breadth of patent 
 
 104. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565-1569 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting) (outlining history of central and peripheral claiming in 
discussing history of doctrine of equivalents), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id.  Courts had developed the doctrine of equivalents even before the transition to 
peripheral claiming.  See id.  That transition, however, made the doctrine even more important in 
avoiding circumvention of patents, because the formality of peripheral claiming lent itself to 
literalism.  See id.  Thus, despite the argument—reasonable as a matter of history but not 
substance—that peripheral claiming was intended to avoid the very sort of uncertainty that the 
doctrine created, the Supreme Court has thrice upheld the doctrine of equivalents under the newer 
peripheral-claiming regime.  See supra notes 83, 102. 
 107. See supra note 102. 
 108. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][b][i][B], 2.06[2].  Prosecution history estoppel 
attempts to cabin the doctrine of equivalents by holding patent applicants to claim-narrowing 
amendments and statements made in the course of patent prosecution.  Id. 
 109. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563, 569 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (barring application of doctrine of equivalents to any claim element narrowed 
by amendment in course of patent prosecution), rev’d, 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002) (rejecting complete 
bar in favor of more flexible, case-by-case approach). 
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protection that Alice could only describe as byzantine.  For each 
patent—no matter how trivial, how unlikely to be litigated, and how 
unlikely to be used or infringed—we insist that the inventor incur the 
enormous expense of describing the invention in great detail and 
precision (usually with the aid of expensive counsel) in patent claims, 
distinguishing those claims from the entire universe of prior art, arguing 
with the examiner, and (upon occasion) appealing disputes through the 
PTO and on up through the courts.  Then, when and if the patent claims 
are litigated, we take a completely fresh, second look at whether what 
the patentee described supports the claims, on pain of invalidating them 
(which may require a second trip to the courts).  Once we’ve determined 
that the claims are properly supported by the expensive description so 
obtained—and therefore valid—we then construe them, often in separate 
Markman hearings,110 because, despite all the effort at precise formalism 
in the drafting and prosecution process, we really don’t necessarily know 
what they mean after all.  Finally, once we’ve determined what they 
mean literally, we have to apply them.  In that process, we must 
determine not only what they mean literally, but what they mean 
equivalently, and whether coverage of equivalents has been abandoned 
through estoppel. 
As a rational and logical being, not having invested years in 
learning and exploiting this byzantine and extravagantly inefficient 
system, Alice might be excused for concluding that it had been designed 
by a madman.  More cynically, she might conclude that a cadre of 
lawyers had designed it, intent on sucking the well springs of innovation 
dry with fees. Certainly no rational economist, conscious of the 
enormous transaction costs and delay of patent prosecution, licensing 
and litigation—and the chances for multiplication of error at every 
stage—would propose such a system if designing new patent laws from 
scratch.  Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a less efficient system more 
prone to error. 
B.  What Should We Do Now? 
So what might Alice recommend we do now?  Three things come to 
 
 110. A Markman hearing is named for the seminal case that made claim construction a task for 
judges, not juries.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) 
(unanimous decision) (stating “[w]e hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art 
within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”).  Because courts exclusively 
construe claims, they may decide, at the parties’ request or sua sponte, to determine the meaning of 
claims in separate hearings, which may occasion separate appeals.  See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 
2.05[3][a][iv]. 
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mind.  First and foremost, Alice might suggest that we stop pretending 
that assessing the breadth of an inventor’s contribution to technology can 
ever be made an entirely formal, mechanical or literal process.  Futile 
attempts to create an effective formalism so far have produced only 150 
years of increasing complexity in law and practice, plus transaction costs 
no doubt measurable in the trillions of dollars. 
Before the Markman decision and its progeny, expert witnesses 
used to help judges without technical training to understand enough of 
the complex technologies at issue to make good patent decisions.  The 
rule against “extrinsic evidence” in construing patent claims111—a direct 
descendant of Markman112—virtually eliminated that testimony in claim 
construction.113  As a matter of policy, Judge Newman and others were 
quite right to lament its passing.114 
But Alice would view the demise of expert testimony as a direct 
consequence of a patently ridiculous fiction: the notion that inventors 
can describe the essence of their contributions in such literal, 
unmistakable language that anyone, including people without any 
technical training whatsoever, can not only understand those cutting 
edge contributions, but also see clearly their precise limitations with 
respect to prior art.  Alice also would consider our current extravagantly 
wasteful and byzantine system a direct consequence of a further policy 
choice.  Why, she would ask, must all inventors incur the enormous cost 
(in time and money) of reducing their inexpressible cutting-edge 
advances to this supposedly unmistakable language, whether or not 
anyone will ever use their inventions and whether or not their patent will 
ever be disputed? 
 
 111. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
The claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic evidence, constitute the 
public record of the patentee’s claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely.  In 
other words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established 
rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and, 
thus, design around the claimed invention . . . .  Allowing the public record to be altered 
or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would 
make this right meaningless. 
Id. at 1583 (Citations omitted). 
 112. See also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (en banc) (confirming that even issues of technical definition of terms used in claiming are 
matters of claim construction and therefore matters of law, not subject to deferential review on 
appeal, and confirming importance of intrinsic evidence expressed in Vitronics). 
 113. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][a][iii] (discussing decisions cited in 
Vitronics and Cybor Corp., their derivation from Markman, their effect in eliminating expert 
testimony from claim construction, and the dissenting views of several judges on this point). 
 114. See, e.g., Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1480 (stating the additional views of Judges Newman 
and Meyer); id. at 1475 (stating the dissenting views of Judges Rader and Newman). 
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Perhaps, Alice might suggest, there is a simpler, more efficient 
alternative.  Suppose an inventor could get a real patent, not just a 
provisional patent,115 simply by filing a description of his or her 
invention, without claims.  Suppose further that the law required a 
complete disclosure, as it does today, i.e., one that is enabling and 
definite, shows possession of the invention, and reveals the “best 
mode.”116  Suppose further that the law encouraged, if not required, the 
inventor to submit to the PTO relevant computerized files (logic 
diagrams, gene sequences, calculations, simulations, experimental data, 
etc.) describing the invention and its limits, to be published only after 
eighteen months (or, if earlier, after patent issuance or a bona-fide 
dispute requiring them).  Next suppose that the inventor would not have 
to draft stylized, legalistic claims, but would simply describe the 
problem, if any, solved by the invention and how it worked (and, if 
relevant, how it was made), in ordinary, technical language.  How would 
this approach change the economics of our current patent system? 
At the outset, this approach would eliminate a major economic 
inefficiency of our current patent system: the fact that it requires every 
patentee—regardless of the importance of his invention or whether it 
will ever be disputed—to incur the enormous expense of attempting to 
reduce the solution of a complex problem at the forefront of technology 
to “bulletproof” stylized legal language.  The FTC also has 
recommended reducing this expense,117 but its recommendations—
chiefly for post-grant inter partes review118—only apply to disputed 
patents and simply shift more business and more fees to another yet 
additional layer of procedure in this already overloaded system. 
A more rational and effective approach might be to recognize that 
gauging the proper breadth of a patent is always a matter of 
understanding and judgment and can never be made a purely formal and 
mechanical process.  Such an approach also might recognize an essential 
fact of life that patent lawyers and judges seem reluctant to 
acknowledge: a generalist lawyer or judge can never hope to achieve the 
same understanding of cutting-edge technology (let alone in a few days 
or weeks of litigation!) that the scientists and engineers who developed it 
 
 115. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b).  Present law allows an inventor to get a provisional patent, good 
for one year only, by filing an application without claims.  See also 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 
1.06[1]. 
 116. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1].  These are the four disclosure requirements of 
today’s patent law in the United States.  Id. 
 117. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 11-12, 17-24 (discussing proposals for expanded 
post-grant inter partes review). 
 118. See id. at 7-8. 
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obtained through a lifetime of study and effort.  All generalists can hope 
to do is see through a glass darkly, with foreseeable consequences for 
the technological and economic validity of their decisions. Therefore, 
Alice might conclude, a more rational approach might encourage the 
courts and other tribunals to make a single judgment, based on the patent 
disclosure alone, without claims, whether an alleged infringer took what 
the patentee invented.  This approach would involve liberal use of expert 
testimony, including, where necessary, experts appointed and paid by the 
court and therefore presumed to be impartial.119  This approach is not 
nearly as radical as it sounds: it is precisely the approach that courts took 
before the switch to peripheral claiming led, in the vain search for 
formal certainty, to the current byzantine system. 
A second approach to simplifying our current terminally byzantine 
system would be to focus on how inventions are made and used in the 
real world.  Present patent doctrine as exemplified in the doctrine of 
equivalents, focuses primarily on an invention’s function, means and 
result.120  Under black-letter patent law, however, function alone cannot 
be patented,121 so that leaves means and result for assessment.  Since 
result also cannot be patented separately,122 Alice would no doubt see 
the primary focus of existing law as on the means that the inventor used 
to accomplish the desired result. 
In this regard, a peculiarity of the patent system would sorely 
puzzle Alice.  That system often neglects or underemphasizes the 
economic, commercial, scientific or engineering motivation for the 
development, i.e., the end to which the means is directed.  In other 
words, the patent system, unlike virtually every scientist or engineer that 
ever lived, now ignores the problem to be solved. 
To be sure, not every invention solves a particular problem.  The 
laser, for example, was not developed to solve any stated problem, but to 
provide a useful source of coherent light, as earlier experiments had 
suggested could be done.  Yet many, if not most, inventions in industry 
arise out of research commissioned to solve a particular problem, 
develop a particular product, or fill a specified need.  Forcing inventors 
to disclose the end (if any) to which their inventions are directed would 
 
 119. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (permitting court to appoint experts of its own selection or 
agreed to by parties). 
 120. See supra note 83. 
 121. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938).  See also 1 DRATLER, supra note 
1, § 2.05[3][c][i] (discussing these cases). 
 122. A patent on a result without the means to achieve it would provide nothing useful to the 
public. 
DRATLER1.DOC 3/11/2005  11:25 AM 
2005] ALICE IN WONDERLAND 329 
assist in interpreting patents and determining whether they are infringed.  
Just as using a different means to solve the same problem is ordinarily 
not infringement,123 so using a similar means to solve a different 
problem might not be infringement, at least from an economic 
perspective, because verifying its ability to do so might still involve a 
significant risk of total failure.  And, as we have seen, it is risk of total 
failure (for nonmarket reasons) that provides the sole rational economic 
justification for the patent system. 
Another benefit of requiring disclosure of the problem to be solved 
would be reducing the flood of patents on inventions of no real value, 
which firms procure solely for legal or other strategic business 
reasons.124  The FTC White Paper discusses what everyone who works 
with patents has long known: that many issue for such economically 
wasteful reasons as threatening or intimidating competitors, bulking up 
patent portfolios for threats or cross-licensing, or additional security in 
case of future disputes.125  Requiring inventors to disclose the 
technological, economic, or other real-world problem, if any, that their 
invention solved would help reveal these patents for what they are and 
encourage courts to narrow their application appropriately.  With the 
help of expert testimony, courts should not have much difficulty 
distinguishing cases in which no problem is cited for these reasons from 
those in which an invention, like the laser, has multiple unforeseen uses 
and should be treated as pioneering. 
In the end, Alice would no doubt dwell at length on a third and 
most important suggestion for solving the patent-breadth line-drawing 
problem: focusing less on formalism and more on substantial economic 
effect.  As she compared American patent law to American antitrust law, 
the relative backwardness of patent law in this respect would puzzle 
Alice.  Hadn’t the United States Supreme Court, as early as 1977, 
decreed that decisions in antitrust law should turn on economics, not 
 
 123. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) 
(enunciating “reverse doctrine of equivalents,” under which device that performs same function to 
achieve same result by substantially different means than patented invention does not infringe, even 
if described literally by patent’s claims); SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (same).  See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.06[3] (discussing reverse 
doctrine of equivalents). 
 124. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 6-7 (executive summary) (recognizing the same 
problem and discussing negative impact of “thicket” of patents on computer industry).  See also id. 
at 27-36 (discussing transaction costs and strategic impediments to follow-on innovation resulting 
from multiple patents). 
 125. See id. at 34-43 (discussing computer industries); id. at 51-56 (discussing software and 
Internet industries). 
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formalism?126  Alice would ponder why the same salubrious principle 
had not found its way into American patent law, despite the fact that 
patent and antitrust are but two sides of the very same coin of economic 
law. 
One way to weigh economic substance more than formalism, Alice 
might suggest, would be to focus on the economic considerations that 
make the invention patentable.  As discussed above, the key factor is the 
risk of total failure and loss of investment that the development process 
overcame.  Once a court knows the problem to be solved and the nature 
and outcome of that development process, it should not be too difficult 
for the court to determine whether the alleged infringer has taken the 
result of that development process without compensation—that is, has 
taken what made the development risky in the first place—thereby 
undermining the incentive to undertake the risk,  or whether the alleged 
infringer, although engaged in similar activities, has not appropriated the 
benefits or results of the patentee’s research to itself. 
Perhaps these suggestions sound simple and obvious.  Yet adopting 
them in legislation would make a radical departure from the current 
system, based as it is in large measure on formalism and economic 
irrelevancies (such as whether or not the invention would have been 
“obvious” to a person of ordinary skill).  As far back as 1977, with its 
groundbreaking decision in GTE Sylvania,127 the Supreme Court decided 
that antitrust law should turn on substantial economic effect, not barren 
formalism.  Isn’t it high time, Alice would wonder, that Congress or the 
courts make a similar decree in patent law? 
IV.  CONCLUSION: PROS AND CONS OF THE FTC’S WHITE PAPER 
After studying our patent system for some time, Alice would no 
doubt conclude that, while vital to our economic well being and laudable 
in principle and purpose, our patent system is fundamentally flawed in 
both theory and practice.  She would likely view the vain search for an 
effective formalism that began with the transition to peripheral claiming 
 
 126. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (stating “departure 
from the rule-of-reason standard [in antitrust law] must be based upon demonstrable economic 
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”).  See also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-726 (1988) (reiterating twice the preference for considering substantial 
economic effect, rather than formalism). 
 127. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (stating “departure 
from the rule-of-reason standard [in antitrust law] must be based upon demonstrable economic 
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”).  See also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-726 (1988) (reiterating twice the preference for considering substantial 
economic effect, rather than formalism). 
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in the nineteenth century as an abject failure.  It has complicated, she 
would think, the processes of examining, prosecuting, interpreting and 
litigating patents immeasurably.  It has also permitted and indeed 
encouraged a flood of patents on essentially worthless “me too” and 
other noninventions, put forward only for legally strategic purposes.  At 
the same time, by treating all things “novel” essentially alike, without 
considering the investment and risk involved in developing them or their 
general economic importance in the larger scheme of science and 
technology, it has sometimes obscured the value of and permitted 
circumvention of patents on fundamental, pioneering inventions. 
Alice would hardly see these defects as the current system’s only 
flaws.  She would note the obsessive quest for precise formal 
descriptions of inventions that may never be tested. Then she would 
wonder why it has been allowed to raise the transaction costs of patent 
searches, infringement opinions, patent prosecution, patent litigation and 
technology management to the point where they are a significant drag on 
industry—perhaps so much so that the cost occasionally overwhelms the 
benefits of innovation that this system encourages.  And she would 
wonder why the present system has forced lay judges and juries to 
immerse themselves in the entrails of technological specialties and 
esoteric semantic disputes far more than they need to do in order to 
understand the economic impact of innovation and patents and make 
good decisions based on real and substantial economic effect.  As Alice 
reviewed all these shortcomings, she might well come to believe that 
patent claim prosecution, amendment, construction, and interpretation 
have become an inordinately expensive and irrelevant semantic game 
that is neither necessary to the healthy functioning of a patent system nor 
desirable for our (or any) economy. 
What, then, might Alice think of the FTC’s white paper?  First of 
all, she would vigorously applaud the FTC for undertaking this project.  
Applause, she would think, is especially due because of the timing of the 
FTC’s effort.  We live at a time in our political history when antitrust 
law is  “on the ropes,” while our legal and political institutions 
concentrate on getting back to business as usual after the bubble, 
recession and scandals of recent years.  By undertaking this project, the 
FTC has underscored what everyone who has eyes to see and ears to 
hear now knows: something is seriously wrong with our patent system.  
If it had done nothing else, the FTC would have made a substantial 
contribution just by making this point. 
A second point on which Alice might praise the FTC is its 
collecting, through its hearings, a factual record underscoring what is 
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wrong with our patent system.  It is one thing for naïfs like Alice or 
academics like me to criticize developments from our ivory tower.  It is 
quite another to note that the very people who use and are often abused 
by the patent system are beginning to notice that it is often 
counterproductive in practice.  The FTC has done our country a great 
service by showing that criticism of the system does not come solely 
from academic purists. 
Alice might also praise the FTC for its fourteen recommendations 
(if you count the subheads).128  Each of them, if adopted, would move 
our system in a better direction. 
The main difficulty that Alice would perceive, however, is that the 
FTC’s recommendations do not go nearly far enough.  There are three 
respects in which the White Paper fails to demonstrate how 
wrongheaded and economically counterproductive certain modern trends 
in patent law may be. 
First, by providing such a long laundry list of recommendations, the 
FTC risks hiding the wheat in the chaff.  Such things as providing a new 
procedure for post-grant opposition129 and changing the burden of proof 
to invalidate patents (from clear and convincing evidence to a 
preponderance)130 may do something to reduce the economic impact of 
bad patents.  But these expedients will do little to close the floodgates of 
litigation or to reduce the flood of patent applications that produces bad 
patents.  Indeed, in the short run, they may actually increase the flood of 
litigation and transactions costs that is threatening to swamp genuine 
innovative industry.  Alice might well view enacting these 
recommendations alone as doing little more than rearranging the deck 
chairs on the Titanic. 
There is a second respect in which Alice might view the FTC White 
Paper as understating the need for reform.  It buries its most important 
suggestions in the middle of the long list of fourteen.  By far the most 
important, as Alice might see it, is the suggestion that the courts consider 
antitrust and competition principles in assessing what is patentable 
subject matter.131  Had the courts done so, it is doubtful that the flow of 
software and business-methods patents would be at its present flood 
stage.  Indeed, proper substantive economic balancing between 
competition and temporary monopoly to provide incentives for 
innovation might well eliminate whole classes of patents now allowed, 
 
 128. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 7-17 (executive summary). 
 129. See id. at 7-8 (executive summary, Recommendation 1). 
 130. See id. at 8-10 (Recommendation 2). 
 131. See id. at 14-15 (Recommendation 6). 
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whose protection is economically counterproductive. 
Finally, Alice might accuse the FTC White Paper of understating 
the need for reform by largely neglecting the second most important 
line-drawing problem in any patent system: the process by which courts 
construe the breadth of patent claims and apply those claims to alleged 
infringements.  Although the FTC White Paper does briefly address the 
doctrine of equivalents,132 its discussion is descriptive and 
inconclusive.133  As Alice with her fresh approach would understand, the 
scope of patentable subject matter and the scope of protection that a 
patent provides go to the economic heart of any patent system.  Their 
burial in the list of recommendations, or their virtual neglect, does not do 
them justice. 
One last comment is worth making.  The FTC white paper may be 
misleading in a rather subtle respect.  It focuses on the relationship 
between patent law and antitrust law and suggests that patent law should 
be construed and applied with competitive principles in mind.134  Alice 
would heartily agree with that view, but she would think that it does not 
go far enough.  What is wrong with our patent system is not just that 
courts often fail to apply competition principles properly when, for 
example, they adjudicate patent licensing or similar commercial 
disputes.  What is wrong with our patent system is that patent law itself, 
as practiced today, is seriously out of whack not only with competition 
principles, but with basic economic common sense.  The defect is not 
just that patent law needs reform in its relationship to antitrust law.  
Rather, based on economic common sense, Alice would claim that 
patent law itself cries out for fundamental internal reform.  It needs 
reform in order to cohere with modern economic thinking on the 
functioning of free markets and the role of entrepreneurial risk and 
reward, as embodied in (among a large number of other things) the 
antitrust law.  In short, Alice would say is it not just the patent-antitrust 
interface that needs a fresh look, but patent law itself. 
The need for plenary reform is not surprising.  The vintage of our 
present patent statute is 1952.  It became law not long after the end of 
 
 132. See id. at 6, 31-33. 
 133. See id. at 6.  The FTC WHITE PAPER does, however, call for “seeking the right balance 
between protection of the patentee and impact on outside competition.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 134. See, e.g., FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 4-6 (executive summary, general remarks), 
10-11 (Recommendation 3(a), suggesting that courts place greater emphasis on commercial success 
in determining whether invention is obvious), 14 (Recommendations 5(d),and 6, suggesting 
consideration of public interest and competition policy, generally and in extending patentable 
subject matter), 17 (Recommendation 10, suggesting expanded consideration of economics 
generally). 
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the Second World War and before the Cold War was far under way.  
Since that time, we have seen the advent of digital computers and 
software, the rise of the integrated circuits and the modern 
semiconductor industry, the discovery of DNA and the advent of 
biotechnology, the “cracking” of the human genome, the genetic 
engineering of plants and animals, and the exploration of space, not to 
mention the explosion of free trade, the globalization of commerce, the 
advent of the TRIPs Agreement, and wide-ranging advance in the 
science of economics.  Here is a partial list of modern innovative 
industries that did not exist, or were in their infancy, when the patent law 
was last substantially revised in 1952: 
* alternative energy (biomass, ethanol, wind, geothermal) 
* atomic energy 
* biotechnology 
* digital computers 
* environmental protection (scrubbers, monitors, etc.) 
* integrated circuits 
* modern medical tools (e.g., CAT, MRI, and PET scans) 
* semiconductors 
* software 
* space exploration and the part of “aerospace” beyond propeller 
planes. 
As this brief list shows, virtually all of the basic industries that 
make up our “innovative” economy arose since the patent law was last 
reformed.  In addition, during the same period economic science grew 
by leaps and bounds, with the help of the very computers, software, and 
data processing techniques that these new industries fostered and made 
possible.  Isn’t is just possible, Alice would wonder, that all these 
dramatic developments justify plenary and thorough reform of our patent 
law? 
Despite all that has happened since the adoption of the 1952 Patent 
Act, Alice would see little difference in substance between it and the 
patent exception in the Statute of Monopolies that she knows so well, 
although the latter was drafted by the English Parliament nearly four 
centuries ago.  At least as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, it still 
depends primarily on the concept of novelty to distinguish ordinary 
business (which is subject to the rule of free competition and a 
consequent prohibition on monopoly) from invention (which may 
deserve limited-term patent protection).  And, as so interpreted, its limits 
still depend on a list of nouns like “manufacture,” rather than on a 
deeper understanding of the economic rationale for patents.  As for the 
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term of the patents, it differs little from the fourteen-year term in the 
Statute of Monopolies,135 which was based on twice the length of an 
apprenticeship in the medieval trade guilds.136  The Federal Circuit has 
even emasculated America’s historic attempt to include economic 
factors, beginning with Jefferson’s “sufficiently useful and important” 
language and culminating with today’s nonobviousness requirement.  
Looking at the 1952 Act from a modern economic perspective, Alice 
could only conclude that it has added little that was unknown in the time 
of Queen Elizabeth I. 
What Alice might fervently hope is that the FTC White Paper will 
be the first step in a long process that will eventually result in a new 
patent statute.  She might hope that that process would be at least as 
thorough and comprehensive the process that which produced the 
Copyright Act of 1976.  It should last five to ten years, include 
administrative, economic and academic studies, and bring to bear the 
considerable mass of legal and economic learning that humanity has 
accumulated during the last half-century.  That process may find, as did 
the FTC itself, that different rules may be economically appropriate for 
different industries.137  That is surely a decision that only Congress can 
make, for the judiciary has neither the expertise nor any statutory basis 
for making it. 
As I suggested at the outset of this paper, the unique historical 
context in which we find ourselves make laws governing innovation 
among the most important for our nation’s economic future.  Because 
our nation is still a world leader, it perhaps is not too arrogant to say that 
our own patent laws may have similar importance for the entire world.  
It’s a good time, and there are many good reasons, to begin the process 
of plenary revision.138  Alice, no doubt, would hope the FTC White 
 
 135. See STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, §§ 6, 10. 
 136. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 895 n. 232. 
 137. Cf. FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 4-14 (describing generally positive role of patents 
in pharmaceutical industry); id. at 33-43, 48-53 (describing difficulties arising from “thicket” of 
patents in computer hardware, semiconductor, software and Internet industries). 
 138. During the University of Akron’s Sixth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy, former Commissioner of Patents Bruce Lehman opined that 
political realities might cause any attempt at patent revision to skew even more dramatically in favor 
of a “land rush” toward economically unjustified private monopoly.  The modern ability of industry 
groups and trade associations, such as the patent bar, to influence Congress on legislation important 
to their interests through lobbying certainly supports this view.  Alice might hope that members of 
Congress might pay close attention to the public interest in revising a statute that bears so directly 
on our nation’s ability to survive economically in a globalized economy in which our comparative 
advantage in manufacturing and farming will have vanished.  In that hope as in others, however, 
Alice might well be naive. 
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Paper gives us all a much-needed shove in that direction. 
